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Abstract 
We study two measures of information dissemination on the determination of systemic risk, 
print-media consumer pessimism and VIX volatility. VIX volatility has a significant direct 
impact upon systemic risk of financial firms under distress, and consumer pessimism does 
impact upon firm’s financial stress via the externality of other firm’s financial stress. In the 
internet bubble of the 1990s, pessimism predicts larger systemic risk in the whole period of 
exuberance while the VIX predicts a sharp larger systemic risk in the height of the bubble. 
Our evidence suggests that consumer pessimism might be dominated by the VIX when 
predicting systemic risk.  
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis of 2008 has brought about a fruitful financial economics research
agenda that discriminates between systematic and systemic risk. In the latter vein, the recent
contribution of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) has become influential in measuring the
value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial system conditional on a financial institution being in some
state of financial distress.1
In parallel, many researchers argue that news media plays an important role in stock 
market movements both theoretically and empirically. Shiller (2000) makes the conjecture 
that investors follow the printed word suggesting that market sentiment is driven by news' 
content. Empirically, Tetlock (2007) is one of the first to show that news media content can 
predict movements in broad indicators of stock market activity. He shows that the number of 
negative words in the daily "abreast of the market" column of the Wall Street Journal can 
predict the daily stock return from 1984 to 1999. More recently, on the same vein Garcia 
(2013) shows that a one standard deviation shock to a measure of market pessimism 
generated from the financial section of the New York Times during recessions predicts a 
change in the conditional average return on the Dow Jones of twelve basis points at the daily 
frequency from 1905 to 2005. 
This paper measures the potential effects of two alternative measures of information 
dissemination on the VaR of financial institution conditional on another financial institution 
being in some state of financial distress. A common determinant of systemic risk is the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX, also known as the “fear” index, e.g. Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011), Chao et al (2012), Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE, 2009). We 
argue here that the VIX contains information about future expectations of market volatility 
embodied in prices of calls and options by market participants, but this may be different from 
real time news data and/or the current printed word that becomes available to market 
participants at the time of their decision making. A key distinction in this paper is that the two 
forms of information dissemination presented refer to real-time printed-word information 
versus information about future expectations. 
We use Garcia’s (2013) data as a real time measure of market sentiment and the CBOE 
Volatility Index VIX as a measure of future expectations. Our main contribution is to use 
information dissemination via consumer pessimism compared to the VIX to predict extreme 
1 Authors such as Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001), Engle and Manganelli (2004), Kuan et al 
(2009) propose alternative measures of value-at-risk. Bisias et al (2012) and Hansen (2013) provide a 
broader review of the alternative approaches.   
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risk of financial institutions in the framework of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Our 
contribution is unique, to our knowledge, in that while others have studied average returns 
conditional on consumer pessimism, none have studied the tail risk of financial institutions 
conditional, on consumer pessimism and essentially how these risks spillover to other 
financial institutions. 
Our sample consists of daily observations from January 2, 1992 to January 3, 2006.2 
We focus on fourteen top financial institutions, namely Citigroup (CITI), American 
International Group Inc (AIG), Bank of America (BofA), Jefferies Group LLC (JEF), 
JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM), Morgan Stanley (MS), Goldman Sachs (GS), Raymond James 
Financial, Inc (RJF), Stifel Financial Corporation (SF),  Wells Fargo (WF), 
Berkshire-Hathway (BRK), Lehman Brothers (LEH), Merrill Lynch (MLC) and Bear Stearns 
(BSC). 
Our key result is that the print-media consumer pessimism variable, that we call pessi, 
has a limited direct effect on the financial stress of institutions whereas the VIX has a more 
significant direct effect. When the VIX is added to the state vector for the VaR estimation, the 
coefficients for the consumer pessimism are no longer statistically significant in most of the 
cases while the coefficients of the VIX are significant. However, the print-media consumer 
pessimism variable has a significant effect on systemic risk via the externality of stress in one 
institution impinged on another. This effect is identified even in the presence of similar VIX 
impact, thus showing that the two sources of information dissemination are distinctly 
identified. The time variation of the predicted VaR and the conditional VaR for a 
representative case shows that the inclusion of the consumer pessimism renders a more 
volatile predicted pattern and a notable reduction in financial stress after the internet bubble 
of the late 1990s. However, the inclusion of the VIX shows a less volatile time pattern and a 
sharper increase in financial stress in the late 1990s only. 
Our empirical results extend the results of several papers that examine the effects of 
consumer pessimism of stock returns, by examining those effects from a more general 
information dissemination perspective on tail risk and on the externalities of tail risk of one 
institution into another, e.g. Da et al. (2011), Jegadeesh and Wu (2011), Kissan et al. (2011), 
Klubmann and Hautsch (2011), and Uhl (2011). We also extend the results of authors such as 
Chen et al. (2011) who compare the information dissemination impact on stock returns of 
print media versus social media, and Mao et al. (2011) who compare several measures of 
                                                              
2 The sample period is where the daily data on market sentiment of Garcia (2013) overlaps with daily 
data of the VIX. 
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sentiment relative to more traditional state variables. Hence, while several recent 
contributions focus on the effects of consumer pessimism on average returns, our key 
contribution is to examine these effects on tail risk. Our evidence suggests that the VIX 
dominates the print-media consumer pessimism as a determinant of systemic risk. 
Lastly, we find that at the one and two day horizon, print-media consumer pessimism 
and VIX have dynamic feedback in the Granger sense, but at longer lags the VIX Granger 
causes the consumer pessimism measure; and in terms of volatility, we find dynamic 
feedback in the same day only. The VIX performs better for the in-sample and out-of-sample 
forecasting of conditional VaR and the in-sample forecast is more accurate overall for either 
measure, but the discrepancy between consumer pessimism and VIX accuracy is larger. In the 
out-of-sample case, the forecasts are less accurate for both measures overall, but the 
discrepancy between consumer pessimism and VIX is smaller relative to the in-sample case. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of 
the two information measures used in the paper and a literature review. Section 3 presents the 
determinants of tail and systemic risk used in the empirical analysis and section 4 describes 
the econometric models and data. Section 5 is the core of the paper where the empirical 
analysis is discussed and section 6 concludes. An extended appendix presents several 
econometric models discussed in the text and will also be available online. 
 
2. Information Dissemination 
In this section, we discuss two sources of information dissemination used in this paper and 
provide a short review of the related literature. Information dissemination traditionally refers 
to a message sent out to a wide audience.3 In this paper, we interpret those messages as 
information that is sent out either via newspaper articles or via the observed prices of call and 
put options. The first is under the general rubric of market sentiment and the second is the 
CBOE’s VIX. The key attribute is that market sentiment can be interpreted as real-time data 
including all information up to its instantaneous release. On the other hand, the VIX refers to 
current information about future expectations of market volatility. We view those as two 
alternative forms of information dissemination, one about messages sent via current real-time 
news, and the other messages regarding expectations of future potential price outcomes. Our 
main thesis is that those two forms of information dissemination may impact differently on 
                                                              
3 For example, Merton (1987) is a classic paper that studies capital markets with alternative 




systemic risk and we are set out to measure the potential differences as they impact the 
determination of conditional tail risk. 
Relating to social media, Chen et al. (2011) use textual analysis of articles published 
both in the Wall Street Journal and Seeking Alpha, a popular social-media platform. They 
find that social-media sentiment associates strongly with contemporaneous and subsequent 
stock returns, even after controlling for traditional-media sentiment. Their benchmark 
sentiment is from "Seeking Alpha", while the "traditional-media" refers to sentiment 
generated from WSJ. They provide evidence that sentiment revealed through Seeking Alpha 
has a larger and longer-lasting impact on stock returns than views expressed in the WSJ. Our 
contribution is in the spirit of Chen et al. (2011), but with alternative information measures.4   
2.1 Market Sentiment 
There are several types of market sentiment data available, but for us data on sentiment 
generated by academic researchers from print media are our main focus.5 First and foremost, 
Tetlock (2007) generated an investor sentiment index from the column "Abreast of the 
market" of the Wall Street Journal. Each day, he used the 77 predetermined General Inquirer 
categories from the Harvard psychosocial dictionary to count the words in the newspaper. He 
then used the number of negative words to generate a measure of media content which 
appears to correspond to either negative investor sentiment or risk aversion. More specifically, 
Tetlock (2007) used a vector autoregressive model to examine the joint distribution of the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average returns and the market pessimism index. He found that high 
media pessimism predicts downward pressure on market prices followed by a mean-reversion 
to fundamentals, and that unusually high or low pessimism predicts higher market trading 
volume.  
Following in those footsteps, Garcia (2013) generates a market sentiment index by 
analyzing the two columns of financial news of the New York Times. He constructs a 
measurement of market pessimism by counting the number of negative and positive words, 
                                                              
4 Also related to social media, Karabulut (2011) takes the Facebook Gross National Happiness (GNH) 
as his sentiment index and finds that GNH has the ability to predict changes both in daily returns and 
trading volume in the U.S. equity market. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in GNH 
predicts an increase in market returns equal to 11 basis points over the next day. Moreover, the impact 
of GNH appears to be stronger among small-cap stocks, and in the face of turmoil. Although Facebook 
has quite a wide cover of different investors, the happiness defined by Facebook reveals a sentiment 
more psychological than financial. 
 
5 Other sentiment indexes are the University of Michigan consumer confidence index, the Thomson 
Reuters News Analytics engine (TRNA) index, the National Happiness Index from Facebook, Twitter 




and then calculating “pessimism” as the number of negative words minus the number of 
positive words divided by total number of words (the sum of positives plus negatives). He 
studies the effect of sentiment on asset prices during the 20th century (1905-2005) using 
methodology similar to Tetlock's (2007). Garcia’s (2013) main finding is that controlling for 
other well-known time-series patterns, the predictability of stock returns using news' content 
is concentrated in recessions. A one standard deviation shock to the pessimism measure 
during recessions predicts a change in the conditional average return on the DJIA of twelve 
basis points over one day.6 
We use Garcia’s (2013) data as our measure of real-time print-ready observations of 
market sentiment. Our main objective is to have a measure of market sentiment that is 
observed daily, based on the daily content of current news stories and that reflects information 
available to all on that day. Our interpretation is that this is real-time information in the sense 
of being measured and available instantaneously to market participants in the print media.7  
2.2 VIX 
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) calculates the CBOE Volatility Index called 
VIX, also known as the “fear” index, CBOE (2009). Originally, it was designed to measure 
the market expectations of 30-day volatility implied by at-the-money S&P100 index option 
prices. In its modern version used in this paper, the VIX is based on the S&P500 index and 
estimates expected volatility by averaging the weighted prices of S&P puts and calls options 
over a wide range of strike prices. The VIX is a volatility index comprised of options with the 
price of each option reflecting the market’s expectation of future volatility of the underlying 
asset price. While “fear” is a form of market sentiment, the VIX contains information about 
future expectations of market volatility embodied in prices of calls and options by market 
participants. We observe that this form of information is quite different from real time print 
news data that becomes available instantaneously to market participants and covers current 
                                                              
6 Compared to Tetlock's (2007) sentiment data, Garcia (2013) uses a different weighting scheme for 
words. While the use of the Harvard Psychological dictionary to define the mood for each word has 
become popular, Loughran and McDonald (2011) argue that words used to analyze financial markets 
sometimes have different meanings relative to their daily common use. Thus, they generate wording 
lists of positive and negative moods specifically for financial market analysis. Garcia (2013) uses 
exactly those new wording lists. 
  
7 The market sentiment data calculated from daily newspapers stories can be analogously interpreted as 
a process of extracting information from real-time data. Croushore (2011) provides a recent survey of 
the literature in this area and another form of extracting information from real-time data is the work of 




business news stories.8 
2.3 Related Literature Review  
In addition to the work of Tetlock (2007) and Garcia (2013), we highlight some related papers 
on information dissemination and processing.  
Da et al. (2011) propose Google trend search frequency as the measure of investor 
attention.9 They show that an increase in the searching frequency predicts higher stock prices 
in the next two weeks and an eventual price reversal within the year. Dimpfl and Jank (2011) 
also use internet search queries as a proxy for retail investor's attention and find significant 
co-movement of stock market realized volatility and search queries for their names. More 
specifically, they find high searches follow high volatility, and high volatility follows high 
searches using Granger causality tests. 
Jegadeesh and Wu (2011) propose another way to quantify the written word tone of 
10-K filings. They uncover a significant relationship between document tone and market 
reaction for both negative and positive words. Their measures are significantly related to the 
filing period returns after controlling for factors such as returns around earnings 
announcements and accruals. Their evidence suggests that the market underreacts to the tone 
of 10-Ks, and this under-reaction is corrected over the following two weeks. Kissan et al. 
(2011) use online ticker searches to forecast abnormal stock returns and trading volumes. 
They argue that since online ticker search captures information of beliefs about cash flows 
and investment risks with less sophisticated retail investors, it can be a proxy for investor 
sentiment. In a sample of S&P500 firms over the period 2005–2008, they find that, over a 
weekly horizon, online search intensity reliably predicts abnormal stock returns and trading 
volume. Klubmann and Hautsch (2011) use the Reuters NewsScope Sentiment Engine as 
their sentiment proxy, which classifies firm-specific news according to positive, neutral and 
negative sentiment based on linguistic pattern analysis of the respective news story. They find 
distinct responses in returns, volatility, trading volumes and bid-ask spreads due to news' 
arrivals. They show that a classification of news according to indicated relevance is crucial to 
filter out noise and to identify significant effects. Moreover, sentiment indicators have 
                                                              
8 Of course, VIX market participants also read the current, real time news and hence we expect that the 
two measures present some degree of correlation. Recently, Bloom (2014) discusses the countercyclical 
aspects of the VIX. 
 
9 The Google search engine is a form of real time data source associated with the nowcasting approach 
to forecasting. See e.g. Varian and Choi (2009) on nowcasting with Google search engines and 




predictability for future price trends even though the profitability of news-implied trading is 
deteriorated by increased bid-ask spreads. Uhl (2011) also uses the Reuters news articles 
sentiment, and find significant effect on the Dow Jones Industrials Index. The paper shows 
that sentiment can explain and predict changes in stock returns better than macroeconomic 
factors. Moreover, they find that negative sentiment performs better in simple trading 
strategies to predict stock returns than positive sentiment, while the sentiment effect remains* 
over months. 
Since there are several kinds of consumer sentiment emerging in recent years, Mao et 
al. (2011) try to compare the effectiveness of different sentiments. They survey a range of 
online data sets like Twitter feeds, news headlines, and volumes of Google search queries and 
sentiment tracking methods like Twitter Investor Sentiment, Negative News Sentiment and 
Tweet & Google Search volumes of financial terms, and compare their value for financial 
prediction of market indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, trading volumes, and 
market volatility measured by the VIX, as well as gold prices. They also compare the 
predictive power of traditional investor sentiment survey data, i.e. Investor Intelligence and 
Daily Sentiment Index, against those of the mentioned set of online sentiment indicators. 
Their results show that traditional surveys of Investor Intelligence are lagging indicators of 
the financial markets. However, weekly Google Insight Search (GIS) volumes on financial 
search queries do have predictive value. An indicator of Twitter Investor Sentiment and the 
frequency of occurrence of financial terms on Twitter in the previous 1-2 days are also found 
to be very statistically significant predictors of daily market log return. Survey sentiment 
indicators are however found not to be statistically significant predictors of financial market 
values, once they control for all other mood indicators as well as the VIX. 
There is a vibrant literature exploring the effects of consumer sentiment on stock 
markets. However, most of the studies mainly discuss the relation between consumer 
sentiment and stock returns or prices. None, to our knowledge, use consumer sentiment to 
predict the extreme risk of stock market. This is our main contribution, to use information 
dissemination via consumer sentiment and compare it to the information dissemination of the 
VIX as determinants of extreme risk of financial institutions.  
 
3. Determinants of Systemic Risk 
Our approach for systemic risk is the tail measure of systemic risk proposed by Adrian and 
9 
 
Brunnemeier (2011). 10  This approach measures co-dependence between tails of equity 
returns and financial institutions. Some form of co-dependence is needed to distinguish the 
impact of the disturbances to the entire financial sector from the firm-specific disturbances in 
this case. Since our main objective is to evaluate the effects of two forms of information 
dissemination on systemic risk, the conditional value at risk (CoVar) approach fits well with 
our purposes. 
3.1 Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
A Value-at-Risk model gives the maximum loss that can be expected, at a particular 
significance level, over a given trading horizon. It is the -quantile of the return distribution 
at time t+d conditioned on the information set tF : 
≝ inf	 : |      (1) 
where tX denotes an asset return and	  is taking values such as 0.05, 0.01 or 0.001 to reflect 
the negative extreme risk. In order to predict VaR, one can use quantile regression, e.g. 
Koenker and Basset (1978). In general, models based in (1) mainly focus on the VaR for 
individual assets and do not directly take into account the potential spillover effects that 
characterize interactions during periods of stress.11 
3.2 Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose the CoVaR concept. Specifically, let ,  
represents some event function of the return of asset i, ,  at time t, and let , be the return 
of another asset. | , ,  is defined as the -quantile of the conditional probability 
distribution: 
, | , , ,                         (2) 
Where  is a vector of state variables potentially including information dissemination 
variables. The standard CoVaR approach is to set , , , .   
 
                                                              
10 Bisias et al. (2012) have summarized and identified at least thirty potential measures of systemic risk. 
While Hansen (2013) points out that there is not a single unified approach for the measurement of 
systemic risk, besides the tail risk used in this paper, he summarizes other three specific useful 
approaches: Contingent claims analysis of Gray and Jobst (2011), who feature risk adjustments to 
sectoral balance sheets while paying special attention to the distinct role of debt and equity; Dynamic, 
stochastic macroeconomic models discussed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Network models in its 
infancy. 
 
11 Engle and Manganelli (2004) propose the nonlinear Conditional Autoregressive Value at 
Risk(CaVaR) model, in which they use lagged VaRs and lagged returns. Chernozhukov and Umantsev 
(2001) propose linear and quadratic time series models for VaR prediction. Kuan et al.(2009) propose 
the Conditional Auto Regressive Expectile model and argue that expectiles are more sensitive to the 
scale of losses. 
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4. Empirical Methodology and Data 
4.1 Model settings 
For our benchmark model setting, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier's (2011) CoVaR 
framework. In the first step, we predict the 5% value at risk (VaR) of an individual asset return
,i tX at the daily horizon using a linear quantile regression model on the market state variables: 
, 	 , , .                                                    (3) 
where  Ti  means the transpose of i ,  , is one or both information variables 
considered (sentiment or vix), and  tM is a vector of the state variables.
12 This model is 
estimated with quantile regression to obtain the coefficients  	 , 1 ,   with 
, | 0. The VaR of asset i is predicted by  
		 , 	 , 	 .         (4) 
The second step is to model the externality of asset i on asset j. Thus, the rate of return of 
asset j is taken to be a linear function of asset’s i return, and this external effect can be 
sensitive to the information variable both directly and through the return of asset i, and state 
variables M. Hence, the specification is 
, 	 | | , | 	 , , | , | , .   (5) 
where we again employ quantile regression and obtain coefficients 	 | , 1 | , 2 | , | , . 
Then, the CoVaR is calculated as: 
, 	 | | , | 	 , , | 	 , | 	 .  (6) 
In summary, expression (5) reflects the externality of the stress of institution i on the 
stress of institution j.13 Our information measures not only affect the stress of institution j 
directly but also influence the externality of institution i via the interaction term and similar 
rationale applies to the CoVaR expression (6). 
4.2 Data 
Our sample consists of daily observations from January 2nd 1992 to January 3rd 2006. Our 
sample include the top investment banks in the U.S. plus America International Group (AIG) 
and Berkshire-Hathway (BRK) which are key market participants in credit default swaps and 
other derivative financial instruments. The institutions are Citigroup (CITI), American 
                                                              
12 Quantile regressions are discussed in Koenker and Bassett (1978). Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
have a set of seven basic state variables. We explain our state vector below. 
 
13 Brunnermeier (2009) describes several channels of externalities among financial institutions 
including fire-sale externality, hoarding externality, bank runs externality and network externality. 
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International Group Inc (AIG), Bank of America (BofA), Jefferies Group LLC (JEF), 
JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM), Morgan Stanley (MS), Goldman Sachs (GS), Raymond James 
Financial, Inc (RJF), Stifel Financial Corporation (SF), Wells Fargo (WF) 
Berkshire-Hathway (BRK), Lehman Brother (LEH), Merrill Lynch (MLC) and Bear Stearns 
(BSC). For each, we have daily stock returns, 	 	 . 
Our state vector may include the information dissemination variables which are the 
consumer pessimism index from Garcia (2013) and the CBOE VIX index. The consumer 
pessimism generated by Garcia (2013) is from the New York Times financial section given by 
market	pessimism	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
. 
where we use pessi for short. Thus the higher (lower) the value of Consumer pessimism index, 
the more (less) pessimistic the market is. The historical data for the VIX can be found on the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange's website. 
The other set of state variables in reference to  in expressions (3)-(5), are the 
remaining six variables used by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), respectively: 
a. Short term liquidity spread: Measuring short-term liquidity risk by the difference between 
the three-month treasury repo rate and the three-month treasury bill rate. The repo data is 
from the Bloomberg database and the treasury bill rate data is from the Federal Reserve Board 
H.15. 
b. The daily change in the three-month treasury bill rate: Adrian and Brunnermeier find that 
the changes have better explanatory power than the levels for the negative tail behavior of 
asset returns. 
c. The change in the slope of the yield curve: The slope is defined by the difference of the 
ten-year treasury rate from the three-month treasury bill rate. 
d. The change in the credit spread between 10 years BAA-rated bonds and the 10 years 
treasury rate. 
e. The daily Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate index returns: The index reflects the information of 
lease rates, vacancies, property development and transactions of real estates in the U.S. 
f. The daily S&P500 index returns: An approximate of the theoretical market portfolio 
returns. 
The variables c., d., e. are from the Federal Reserve Board H.15 and the data of e. and f. are 
from Yahoo Finance.14 
                                                              
14 In both Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) as well as Chao et al.(2012) semi-parametric approach, the 
VIX is also used as a state variable, a proxy of market fear. Since we consider the measure of consumer 
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Table 1 presents the summary of our data set. The total sample is from January 2, 1992 
to January 3, 2006 while the sample for the return of Morgan Stanley (MS) is from February 
23, 1993 to January 3, 2006, the sample for the return of Goldman Sachs (GS) is from May 5, 
1999 to January 3, 2006, the sample for the return of Berkshire-Hathway(BRK) is from May 
10, 1996 to January 3, 2006 and the sample of Lehman Brother(LEH) is from May 3, 1994 
to January 3, 2006, since the stocks of Goldman Sachs, Berkshire-Hathway and Lehman 
Brother(LEH) went public later than January 2, 1992.15 We define the daily stock return of 
all fourteen institutions as well as the S&P500 index and the Dow Jones US Real Estate index 
returns as the business day difference of the logarithm of the adjusted close prices. The VIX 
remains as the original data from the Chicago Board Options Exchange's website. The 
Consumer pessimism is the market pessimism of Garcia (2013) as explained above. We can 
highlight in Table 1 that the maximum value of the Consumer pessimism is 0.066, the 
minimum value of it is -0.019 and the average of the total sample is 0.013. As mentioned 
the higher the value of Consumer pessimism, the more pessimistic the market is and our 
sample is biased on average towards more pessimistic days.  
 
5. Systemic Risk and Information Dissemination  
5.1 Consumer pessimism 
In this set of regressions, we include the current consumer pessimism measure, pessi, in the 
VaR and CoVaR estimations, but do not include the VIX in the state vector. 
The first set of regressions estimated is the quantile regression equation (3) to obtain 
the VaR of each institution. In our quantile regressions, τ always takes the value of 0.05 (5%). 
Next, we generate the predicted VaR of each institution as defined in equation (4) and run the 
quantile regression defined in equation (5) to get the coefficients to predict CoVaR for each 
institution as well as to capture the systemic risk across different institutions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
sentiment of Garcia (2013) as real time data, we use its value as of the current period, t, while the VIX 
as used in the authors above is part of the state variables at t-1. 
 
15 While Morgan Stanley first went public in 1986, its data starts on Feb 23, 1993. The issue is the 
following. In 1997, Morgan Stanley merged with a financial services company called Dean Witter, 
Discover & Co and the new company at the time was named Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter, Discover & 
Co. At the time, each share of Morgan Stanley stock was converted into 1.65 shares of Dean Witter 
stock. However, Dean Witter, Discover &Co., a spinoff from Sears, first went public on February 22, 
1993 starting trading on February 23, 1993. Since in 1997, Morgan Stanley stock was converted into 
Dean Witter, the new company at the time MS, DW, D & Co just goes back to when Dean Witter was 




Tables 2 show the CoVaR regression results for CITI, AIG and BofA.16 Columns 
(1-13) present the stress external effect of the thirteen other institutions on Citigroup 
including the effects of the consumer pessimism pessi directly and through the externality. 
The direct effect of pessi is negligible and not statistically significant in all except for two 
cases. However, the effect of pessi through the externality of other institutions on CITI is 
positive and statistically significant in more than half of the  cases. In the cases of American 
International Group, Columns (14-26), the direct effect of pessi is negative and statistically 
significant in seven cases and the effect through the externality is positive and significant in 
eight cases. The qualitative direct effect implies that an increase in consumer pessimism 
decreases the already negative VaR making the potential losses higher. However, when 
interacted with the external effect of financial stress of other institutions, the impact of 
financial stress of the other institution on the stress of AIG is larger in magnitude due to the 
consumer pessimism effect. 
Columns (27-39) show that for Bank of America the direct effect of pessi is 
statistically significant in six cases, and significant in five cases via externality. For all other 
companies j, tables are in the appendix. For JEF, there is almost no direct effect, but there are 
five significant cases via the externality. In the cases of JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Lehman 
Brother, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns, there are both negative statistically significant direct 
effect of pessi and positive effect via externality. The cases of Goldman Sachs, Stifel 
Financial and Berkshire-Hathway show negligible direct and indirectly via externality effects 
while Raymond James Financial and Wells Fargo show no direct effects, but several effects 
via externality.       
Figure 1.1 shows the summary of all CoVaR estimations in terms of the external 
effects of institution i on institution j via the pessi variable, as a directed network. 17 
Institutions like Goldman Sachs, Stifle Financial and Berkshire-Hathway are seen with very 
few directed arrows indicating low impact of the consumer pessimism via externality for 
those institutions. Bank of America, Jefferies Group Raymond James Financial Bear Stearns 
and Wells Fargo have a little bit more external stress impact through consumer pessimism. 
Other institutions like Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan, AIG, Lehman Brother and 
                                                              
16 All regressions of the VaR estimations from equation (3) are available upon request. Tables 2 present 
results for three companies, the remaining regressions for the other seven companies are discussed but 
available in an online appendix. 
 
17 Acemoglu et al. (2013) studies the network foundations of systemic risk; see also the survey of 
Hansen (2013). 
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CITI are much more impacted by consumer pessimism via externalities.  
Figure 1.2 row(1) shows cases of the CoVaR and VaR prediction sequence for each 
Citigroup when JPMorgan is under financial stress; and in the case of JPMorgan, when 
Citigroup is under financial stress.18 For all 14 institutions, the CoVaR forecasts (red) seem to 
be closer to the average bottom 5% returns (green) as compared to the VaR forecasts (blue). 
The reason for this difference is that the CoVaR captures the additional external effect of 
systemic risk. However, one can also notice that even the CoVaR forecasts deviate 
significantly from the bottom 5% returns average line. The graph for GS in the sample 
1999-2006 shows the norm for all companies that the predicted VaR and CoVaR have higher 
absolute value in the mid to late 1990s in the period of what Shiller (2000) coined as irrational 
exuberance. Mostly after 2001, both VaR and CoVaR decrease in absolute value coinciding 
with the end of the internet bubble.  
5.2 VIX 
While consumer pessimism (pessi) represents one form of information dissemination, the 
VIX aggregates an alternative form of information dissemination, information about future 
expectations. Both Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) as well as Chao et al (2012) include the 
VIX as a state variable. 
Table 3 shows the CoVaR regression results with the VIX for the three companies 
CITI, AIG and BofA. Column(1)~ Column(13) present the stress external effect of the 
fourteen other institutions on CITI including the effects of the VIX directly and through the 
externality. In contrast to the consumer pessimism case, the direct effect of the VIX 
statistically significant and negative in all cases; and the effect of VIX through the externality 
of other institutions on CITI is positive and statistically significant in most cases. The 
qualitative direct effect implies that an increase in VIX decreases the already negative VaR 
making the potential losses higher. However, when interacted with the external effect of 
financial stress of other institutions, the impact of financial stress of the other institution on 
the stress of CITI is larger in magnitude due to the VIX effect when both coefficients for the 
other institutions and VIX are statistically significant.   
In the case of AIG, Columns (14-26), the direct effect of VIX is negative and 
statistically significant in all cases and the effect through the externality is positive and 
                                                              
18 There are 182 figures of sequences in total; we present one sequence as representative of the time 
varying VaR and CoVaR; and similarly for Figures 2.2 and 3.2. Figure2 presents the sequences of two 






significant in seven cases. Columns (27-39) show that for BOA the direct effect of the VIX is 
statistically significant in all cases, and significant in seven cases via externality. For other 
regressions available in the appendix, in the case of JEF, there is only three significant cases 
of direct effect but six cases via the externality. In the cases of JP, MS, BRK, LEM, MLC and 
BSC there are both negative statistically significant direct effects of VIX and positive effect 
via externality. The case of GS has negative and statistically significant direct effect of VIX in 
all cases (in contrast to the pessi case), and six cases via externality. RFJ and WF show all 
significant direct effects and almost all significant effects via externality. SF is quite different 
than the other institutions in relation to the impact of VIX. There are very few significant 
direct effects, but they are all positive and the effect through the externality is not significant 
at all.       
Figure 2.1 shows the summary of all CoVaR regressions in terms of the external 
effects of institution i on institution j via the VIX variable, as a directed network. All 
institutions are impacted by VIX via externalities with the stark exception of SF. 
Figure 1.2 row (2) shows the CoVaR and VaR prediction sequence of CITI when JP is 
under financial stress; and in the case of JP when CITI is under financial stress. Similarly to 
the case of the consumer pessimism, the CoVaR forecasts (red) are closer to the average 
bottom 5% returns (green) when compared to the VaR forecasts (blue) because of the 
additional external effect of systemic risk and via the VIX. Relative to the consumer 
pessimism case above, the predicted VaR and CoVaR is notably less volatile across the time 
sample and the pattern is one of a sharper decline late in 1999 relative to the mid-1990s and 
after 2001. This evidence points to the potential more prominent impact of print-media 
consumer pessimism in the period of exuberance of the mid to late 1990s as a determinant of 
firm’s higher financial stress.     
5.3 Consumer pessimism versus VIX 
An important thesis of this paper is that the two forms of information dissemination proposed 
refer to real-time instantaneous information versus information about future expectations. 
What are the results when we include both consumer pessimism and VIX in the VaR and the 
CoVaR estimations? 
Tables 4 show the CoVaR regression results for the selected companies CITI, AIG and 
BOA . The tables, including the ones in the appendix, show the stark contrast of the direct 
effect of the two information variables on the financial stress of institutions. The VIX has a 
negative and statistically significant effect in all but one case of institution CITI; while in 
only three cases the consumer pessimism have significant direct impact. However, through 
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the externality of other institutions, both the VIX and the consumer pessimism have 
significant and separately identified effects in most of the  cases.   
Figure 3.1 (a, b) shows the summary of all CoVar regressions in terms of the effects of 
institution i on institution j via the pessi and the VIX variables as a directed network. The 
direct external effects of the information variables are more intense in the case of the VIX, but 
the consumer pessimism impacts significantly in many cases, showing the key relevance of 
the external effects of other institutions in the determination of tail risk and in the potential 
identification of informational effects.  
Figure 3.2 shows he CoVaR and VaR prediction sequence for part of the institutions 
when both the consumer pessimism and the VIX are included, and when JPMorgan is under 
financial stress; and in the case of JPMorgan when CITI is under financial stress for each 
institution. Similarly, the CoVaR forecasts (red) are closer to the average bottom 5% returns 
(green) when compared to the VaR forecasts (blue) because of the additional external effect of 
systemic risk and via consumer pessimism and VIX. The time variation is slightly more 
similar to the VIX only case in the sense that the predicted VaR and CoVaR is slightly less 
volatile across the time sample and the pattern is one of a sharper decline late in 1999 relative 
to the mid-1990s and after 2001. 
5.3.1 Consumer pessimism versus VIX: Granger Causality and Volatility Causality 
The instantaneous correlation between consumer pessimism and (lagged) VIX is positive, 
statistically significant and of an order of magnitude of 21.7%. We believe this is not enough 
to make collinearity a main culprit for the results above. Figure 4 shows the daily sequence of 
VIX and consumer pessimism. We found that VIX moves less vibrantly than pessi in the 
short run while in the long run, pessi remains more constant. In this section we ask the 
following question: Do consumer pessimism measured by pessimism and the VIX have any 
causal relationship, both in the Granger sense of their conditional expectation, and/or in the 
sense of their volatility?  
First, we examined the sample cross-correlation function between consumer 
pessimism and VIX. The correlations are all positive so that both series co-move in the same 
direction. A peak correlation is where the VIX leads the consumer pessimism by one day.19  
Then, we perform Granger causality tests between the two variables at alternative lags. 
Table 5 shows Granger causality tests between consumer pessimism and VIX. In the very 
short horizon of one and two days, there is some evidence of causality in both directions 
                                                              
19 This is available at the accompanying website to be completed. 
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(dynamic feedback) even though causality from the VIX to consumer pessimism is stronger. 
After the two day horizon, there is no evidence of feedback from consumer pessimism to 
VIX and the VIX Granger causes the consumer pessimism in a unidirectional manner. 
We perform similar analysis using a measure of volatility of the consumer pessimism 
and the VIX given by the predicted standardized squared residuals of an 
ARCH(1)-GARCH(1) model fit for each variable separately. Most of the correlations 
between volatilities are not significant, but the red line shows a peak correlation where the 
VIX volatility leads the consumer pessimism volatility by 13 days.   
We then test variance causality between the two series using the method proposed by 
Cheung and Ng (1996). Table 6 shows variance causality tests between consumer 
pessimism and VIX at alternative lags according to the CCF statistic of Cheung and Ng 
(1996). The values are based on the cross correlation function estimated from the squared 
standardized residuals of the ARCH(1)-GARCH(1) models for each variable shown in 
Figure 5. The test is performed for each lag using the chi-square distribution with 1 degree 
of freedom at a 5% significance level (3.8414). The reported results are the statistically 
significant ones. We find significant causality in variance from the VIX to the consumer 
pessimism at lag 13 (13 days) and from the consumer pessimism to the VIX at lag 6 (6 
days). There is significant simultaneous causality in variance at lag 0, in the same day. 
Hence, we find that in the very short term, one or two days, consumer pessimism and 
VIX have dynamic feedback, but at longer lags the VIX Granger causes the consumer 
pessimism measure. This is not surprising since the VIX is a more explicit forward looking 
measure. In terms of volatility, we also find dynamic feedback in the same day, but very little 
significant causality in both directions at longer lags. 
5.3.2 Consumer pessimism versus VIX: In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Predictions 
In this section, we compute in-sample and out-of-sample predictions of the estimated CoVaR 
with the two alternative sources of information dissemination separately and compare their 
accuracy. The remaining state variables are the same and the only difference is the 
information variable. The loss function for the forecasting accuracy is defined as the squared 
difference between the predicted 5% CoVaR and the actual 5% quantile of the return of the 
financial institution in question.  
In the in-sample case, the VIX performs better in 170 out of the 182 cases, while the 
consumer pessimism performs better in only 12 cases, 6 being for the case of JEF. The VIX 
works much better when capturing the extreme returns in the two step system of quantile 
regressions. The top ranked pairs are (JEF, WF); (GS, BRK), (BSC, JP), (GS, BofA) and 
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(CITI, WF) which have a discrepancy in performance of less than 2% and for those pairs the 
systemic risk prediction is not sensitive to the type of information being considered. The 
Berkshire-Hathaway (BRK) shows in the top 5 ranked for the largest discrepancy. The next 
lower ranked pairs are (SF, GS), (GS, SF), (BRK, GS), (BRK, BSC), (AIG, SF), (BRK, AIG), 
(RJF, SF), (LEH, SF) which have the discrepancy with the performance of consumer 
pessimism worst 500% or above that of VIX. For those pairs, the VIX provides a much 
superior systemic risk prediction than consumer pessimism, in particular for 
Berkshire-Hathaway.     
In the out-of-sample case, the VIX performs better in 178 out of the 182 cases, while 
the consumer pessimism performs better in only 4 cases and the VIX works better for the 
out-of-sample as well. First, for SF pessimism works better in all 4 cases. The top ranked 
pairs are (SF, JP), (SF, BRK), (SF, GS) and (SF, BSC) which have a discrepancy in 
performance of less than 2% and for those pairs the systemic risk prediction is not sensitive to 
the type of information being considered. The lower ranked pairs are (BSC, BRK); (JP, BRK), 
(CITI, BRK) and (JP, GS) which have the largest discrepancy with the performance of 
consumer pessimism worst 300% or above that of VIX. For those pairs, the VIX provides a 
superior systemic risk prediction than consumer pessimism. 
Hence, the in-sample is more accurate overall for either measure, but the discrepancy 
between consumer pessimism and VIX accuracy is larger. In the out-of-sample case, the 
forecasts are less accurate for both measures overall, but the discrepancy between consumer 
pessimism and VIX is smaller relative to the in-sample case. 
5.3.3 Consumer pessimism versus VIX: Summary 
Our evidence points to several key remarks. First, the direct effect of the print-media 
consumer pessimism variable on the financial stress of institutions is limited whereas the VIX 
has a more significant direct effect. When the VIX is added to the state vector for the VaR 
estimation, the coefficients for the consumer pessimism are no longer statistically significant 
in most of the cases while the coefficients of the VIX are significant. However, the 
print-media consumer pessimism variable has a significant effect on systemic risk via the 
externality of stress in one institution impinged on another. This effect is identified even in the 
presence of similar VIX impact, thus showing that the two sources of information 
dissemination are distinct.  
Second, the time variation of the predicted VaR and CoVaR for a representative case 
shows that the inclusion of the consumer pessimism renders a more volatile predicted pattern 
and a notable reduction in financial stress after the internet bubble of the late 1990s. However, 
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the inclusion of the VIX shows a less volatile time pattern and a more sharp increase in 
financial stress in the late 1990s only.    
Third, at the one or two day horizon, print-media consumer pessimism and VIX have 
dynamic feedback in Granger sense, but at longer lags the VIX Granger causes the consumer 
pessimism measure; and in terms of volatility, we find dynamic feedback in the same day only. 
The VIX performs better for the in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting of CoVaR and the 
in-sample forecast is more accurate overall for either measure, but the discrepancy between 
consumer pessimism and VIX accuracy is larger. In the out-of-sample case, the forecasts are 
less accurate for both measures overall, but the discrepancy between consumer pessimism 
and VIX is smaller relative to the in-sample case. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
We examine the effect of information that is sent out either via newspaper articles or via the 
observed prices of call and put options on the tail risk and systemic risk of ten top large 
financial services institutions. We use Garcia’s (2013) data as a measure of market sentiment 
and the CBOE Volatility Index VIX.  
The two forms of information dissemination proposed have potentially distinct and 
identifiable effects on systemic risk. The print media consumer pessimism impacts financial 
stress through the externality of other firm’s financial stress while the VIX has a direct effect 
and through the externality. In the mid to late 1990s period of exuberance, given the internet 
bubble, the consumer pessimism predicted a higher financial stress while the VIX predicted a 
sharp temporary increase in financial stress close to the burst of the bubble in 1999.   
We find that in the very short term, one or two days, consumer pessimism and VIX 
have dynamic feedback, but at longer lags the VIX Granger causes the consumer pessimism 
measure. In terms of volatility, we also find dynamic feedback in the same day, but very little 
significant causality in both directions at longer lags. This piece of evidence confirms our 
suspicion that market participants that engage into trades with call and put options also read 
the real time news that form the basis for the consumer pessimism real time data. 
Our in-sample versus out-of-sample forecasts show that the VIX has more accuracy 
than the consumer pessimism for both in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts. In the 
out-of-sample case, the forecasts are less accurate for both measures overall, but the 
discrepancy between consumer pessimism and VIX is smaller relative to the in-sample case. 
An important thesis of this paper is that the two forms of information dissemination proposed 
impact systemic risk in distinct ways and we find empirical evidence supporting this 
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proposition. More importantly, while print-media consumer pessimism have been found to 
impact average returns, we do not find this to be the case for predicting tail risk, once we 
control for the VIX. Our suggestion is that the measure of consumer pessimism might in fact 
be dominated, in terms of predictive power for tail risk, by a relatively known forward 
looking measure of volatility, the VIX. 
Whether or not this suggestion generalizes to other measures of consumer pessimism 
that are based on print-media and/or real-time is certainly a topic for future investigation. In 
addition, further research on other firms, sectors and industries may prove useful to better 
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Table 1:  Summary of Data  
Variable Obs Date Range Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumer pessimism (Pessi) 3484 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0126331 0.0103836 -0.019293 0.0664452
VIX 3483 01/02/92~01/03/06 19.22203 6.523288 9.31 45.74 
S&P500 index 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0001505 0.0044261 -0.03089 0.0242043
Change in the credit spread 3485 01/02/92~01/03/06 -0.000284 0.028859 -0.16 0.19 
Change in the slope of the yield curve 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 -0.001127 0.0614187 -0.56 0.48 
Change in the three-month treasury bill rate 3339 01/02/92~01/03/06 -9.28E-05 0.0400699 -0.49 0.23 
Short term liquidity spread 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.2220591 0.2012501 -0.38 1.33 
Dow Jones US Real Estate index returns 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.000101 0.003511 -0.024803 0.0201852
Citigroup (CITI) 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.000417 0.0092968 -0.074325 0.0731082
American International Group Inc(AIG) 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 -4.03E-05 0.010185 -0.183922 0.0454415
Bank of America(BofA) 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0000337 0.0108156 -0.309985 0.0366141
Jefferies Group LLC(JEF) 3486 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0002062 0.0161109 -0.437613 0.1172139
JPMorgan Chase & Co(JP) 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0001058 0.0112469 -0.308919 0.0645922
Morgan Stanley(MS) 3204 02/23/93~01/03/06 0.00011 0.0133973 -0.311986 0.0646178
Goldman Sachs (GS) 1652 05/05/99~01/03/06 0.0003918 0.0241339 -0.140604 0.1416211
Raymond James Financial, Inc.(RJF) 3481 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0000544 0.0116664 -0.179172 0.0594062
Stifel Financial Corporation(SF) 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0001984 0.009572 -0.117551 0.1411361
Wells Fargo(WF) 3487 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0000746 0.0100464 -0.298072 0.0529204
Berkshire-Hathway(BRK) 2398 05/10/96~01/03/06 0.0001767 0.006481 -0.03045 0.0482575
Lehman Brother(LEH) 2905 05/03/94~01/03/06 0.0004583 0.0119122 -0.089234 0.0765983
Merrill Lynch(MLC) 3484 01/02/92~01/03/06 0.0003357 0.010394 -0.053409 0.0610086




Table 2 CoVaR Estimations with External Effects of Pessi – CITI, AIG and BOA. This table reports the coefficients from regressions of the 5% CoVaR on the 
daily returns of the alternative institutions where j=CITI, AIG and BOA respectively. We ran the VaR regression (3) and the table gives the coefficients of the quantile 
regression (5) X , 	 α | π | ID , π | 	 ID , X , β | X , γ | M ε ,  where 	ID , is pessi. For example, in column (1), it shows the estimating 
results when j= CITI and i= AIG, thus 0.4647 is the coefficient for AIG, -0.0156 is the coefficient of pessi while 11.2757 is the coefficient of the interaction between 
AIG and pessi. 
j=CITI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
i= AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.4647*** 0.6390*** 0.0975*** 0.4923*** 0.3984*** 0.1379 0.1988** 0.0378 0.4675*** 0.2372 0.3037*** 0.4117*** 0.3675*** 
pessi -0.0156 0.0025 -0.0110 0.0321 0.0219 0.0074 -0.0107 -0.0806 -0.0768* -0.1338** 0.0087 0.0262 0.0345 
pessi*i 11.2757*** 3.4598 14.0259*** 9.8797*** 6.7619** 5.2071 12.3409* 9.7170 13.8772*** 16.2498 7.2959 7.3527 9.5962* 
j=AIG (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
i= CITI BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.3239*** 0.3728*** 0.0329 0.2736*** 0.2157*** 0.0396 0.1728** 0.0311 0.4484*** 0.2958 0.1987*** 0.2488*** 0.2480*** 
pessi -0.0620* -0.0418 -0.0978** -0.0280 -0.0473 -0.0729 -0.0617 -0.1222** -0.0855* -0.0906* -0.0972** -0.0653 -0.0892** 
pessi*i 5.5764 5.1850 12.0507*** 6.2182*** 3.7604* 7.8066** 7.3016* 6.9624 5.2554* 6.6609 5.9344* 5.6274 7.4783** 
j=BOA (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
i= CITI AIG JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.4131*** 0.3648*** 0.0807*** 0.4567*** 0.3169*** 0.0463 0.1736*** 0.0129 0.5741*** 0.1453 0.2399** 0.3273*** 0.2912*** 
pessi -0.0522 -0.0584* -0.1040** -0.0233 -0.0447 -0.0389 -0.0793* -0.1410*** -0.0776** -0.0872 -0.0356 -0.0709* -0.0515 








Table 3 CoVaR Estimations with External Effects of VIX – CITI, AIG and BOA. This table reports the coefficients from regressions of the 5% CoVaR on the 
daily returns of the alternative institutions where j=CITI, AIG and BOA respectively. We ran the VaR regression (3) and the table gives the coefficients of the quantile 
regression (5) X , 	 α | π | ID , π | 	 ID , X , β | X , γ | M ε ,  where 	ID , isVIX. For example, in column (1), it shows the estimating 
results when j= CITI and i= AIG, thus -0.0096 is the coefficient for AIG, -0.0003 is the coefficient of VIX while 0.0292 is the coefficient of the interaction between 
AIG and VIX. 
j=CITI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
i= AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i -0.0096 0.3751*** -0.3580*** 0.2409* 0.1556 -0.1763 -0.1311 -0.1281 -0.0654 -0.0754 0.0611 0.2966 0.0547 
vix -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0008*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
vix*i 0.0292*** 0.0137** 0.0296*** 0.0141** 0.0140** 0.0163*** 0.0214*** 0.0115 0.0341*** 0.0207 0.0136 0.0100 0.0192* 
j=AIG (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
i= CITI BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1539 0.2250** -0.2484*** 0.1220 0.2028 -0.0323 -0.0993 -0.1987 0.0085 0.2084 0.1819 0.2091 0.1219 
vix -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
vix*i 0.0109** 0.0079* 0.0198*** 0.0105* 0.0031 0.0065 0.0158*** 0.0136* 0.0212*** 0.0045 0.0024 0.0035 0.0087 
j=BOA (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
i= CITI AIG JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1033 0.2047** -0.1484* 0.5541*** 0.0607 0.0835 -0.0579 -0.1425 0.2555*** 0.3124 0.1740 0.2382* 0.2642** 
vix -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 






Table 4 CoVaR Estimations with External Effects of Pessi and VIX – CITI, AIG and BOA. This table reports the coefficients from regressions of the 5% CoVaR 
on the daily returns of the alternative institutions where j=CITI. We ran the VaR regression (3) and the table gives the coefficients of the quantile regression (5) 
, 	 | | , | 	 , , | , | ,  where 	 , is VIX and pessi. For example, in column (1), it shows the estimating 
results when j= CITI and i= AIG, thus 0.0001 is the coefficient for AIG, 0.0694 is the coefficient of pessi while -0.0003 is the coefficient of VIX, 4.5566 is coefficient 
of the interaction between AIG and pessi, while 0.0254 is the coefficient of the interaction between AIG and VIX. 
j=CITI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
i= AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.0001 0.3793*** -0.4414*** 0.2768* 0.0634 -0.2242* -0.0769 -0.1169 -0.0947 -0.1526 0.0066 0.2767 0.0380 
pessi 0.0694* 0.0498 0.0344 0.0404 0.0524 0.0172 0.0558 0.0070 0.0310 0.0116 0.0260 0.0710* 0.0693* 
vix -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 
pessi*i 4.5566** 4.2869 11.9609*** 2.9232* 6.0688* 4.4588 7.0220 4.6187 10.9267** 14.3769 6.9744 5.8838 8.0289* 
vix*i 0.0254*** 0.0109* 0.0260*** 0.0112** 0.0137** 0.0150** 0.0151** 0.0091 0.0258*** 0.0142 0.0120 0.0064 0.0147 
j=AIG (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
i= CITI BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1068 0.2225** -0.3095*** 0.1438 0.1527 -0.1082 -0.2036* -0.2030 0.0255 0.3105 0.1233 0.1586 0.1133 
pessi -0.0134 0.0472 0.0022 0.0284 0.0092 -0.0026 -0.0040 -0.0297 -0.0031 0.0279 -0.0010 0.0063 -0.0293 
vix -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
pessi*i 3.5591 2.7841 7.1036*** 5.2164*** 2.2094 6.9167** 5.8536 0.2204 0.8059 4.0268 3.6446 1.6774 6.6225* 
vix*i 0.0112** 0.0065 0.0188*** 0.0067 0.0038 0.0064 0.0165*** 0.0132* 0.0200*** 0.0001 0.0028 0.0048 0.0057 
j=BOA (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
i= CITI AIG JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.0708 0.0210 -0.2205*** 0.5132*** 0.0529 0.0368 -0.0625 -0.0993 0.2319** 0.2498 0.0742 0.2055* 0.2050* 
pessi -0.0140 -0.0382 -0.0273 -0.0060 -0.0169 0.0471 -0.0299 -0.0166 -0.0481 -0.0279 0.0241 -0.0217 -0.0290 
vix -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
pessi*i 3.6068 8.7181*** 6.0713*** 3.0044* 0.6862 3.5676 3.8645 6.2972 4.9624* 7.8610 5.5414 2.6543 6.3824** 





Table 5: Granger Causality Tests – Consumer pessimism (pessi) – VIX 
Asymptotic Chi-Square reported. 
 
Lags 
H0: vix_close does not Granger-cause 
pessi 
H0: pessi does not Granger-cause 
vix_close 
1 chi2(1) =  133.09 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2(1) =    6.20 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0128 
2 chi2(2) =  357.17 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2(2) =    8.32 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0156 
3 chi2(3) =  366.97 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2(3) =    5.31 
Prob > chi2 =  0.1507 
4 chi2(4) =  362.13 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2(4) =    6.81 
Prob > chi2 =  0.1463 
5 chi2(5) =  366.55 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2(5) =    6.86 
Prob > chi2 =  0.2309 
10 chi2(10) =  355.58 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000
chi2(10) =    7.86 
Prob > chi2 =  0.6426 
15 chi2(15) =  357.84 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2(15) =   11.01 




Table 6: Variance Causality Tests – Consumer pessimism (pessi) – VIX - 
CCF Statistic and Chi-Square reported. If lag<0, causality in variance from VIX to consumer pessimism (pessi); if lag>0 causality from consumer pessimism (pessi) to VIX; if 
lag=0, feedback in variance in the same day.  
Lags cross_corr_pessi_vix CCF-Statistic chi2_sample 
-13 0.06769 0.004582 15.8674 
0 0.04418 0.001953 6.7619 
6 0.03950 0.001561 5.4055 
















Note: Each arrow indicates the statistically significant effect of institution i on institution j 
 via the interaction of institution i with pessi(Figure1.1)./VIX(Figure2.1)/pessi and VIX(Figure3.1). In these figures, 
the more arrows on one spot(institution j), indicates that the more external stress from other institutions through 

























































(b). Stress of institution i through VIX on j - pessi included
Figure 3.1 Stress of institution i through pessi and VIX on j
29 
 
       
Figure 1.2: Daily returns 0.05 quantile predictions with pessi in row (1) and VIX in row (2) for the 14 financial institutions. The y-axis is date and the x-axis is daily return. The blue lines represent the VaR 
predictions, the red lines are the representing CoVaR predictions, in row(3) the green lines are the actual returns and the solid yellow line is the actual 5% quantile. The sample size is N=3487. To be more specific, 
in the graph for Citigroup, the CoVaR predictions are generated when JPMorgan is under financial stress, while in the graph for JPMorgan, the CoVaR predictions are generated when Citigroup is under financial 
stress. Both graph show that, by comparison, in reference to the internet bubble of the 1990s, the consumer pessimism (pessi) predicts larger systemic risk in the whole period of exuberance while the VIX predicts a 
sharp larger systemic risk in the height of the bubble. 
 
     
Figure 3.2: Daily returns 0.05 quantile predictions with both pessi and VIX for the 10 financial institutions. The y-axis is date and the x-axis is daily return. The blue lines represent the VaR predictions, the red lines 
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Figure 4: Time series pattern of VIX and consumer pessimism. This figure shows the time-series pattern of the VIX and the consumer pessimism (pessi). It shows that the average level of VIX is higher during 
the period of 1996~2003, while the average level for pessi remains more constantly in the long run. Moreover, in the short run, VIX moves more smoothly while pessi moves more vibrantly. The corresponding days 





             































                        APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION, TO BE AVAILABLE ONLINE TOGETHER WITH DATA) 
Table A1    CoVaR Estimations with External Effects of Pessi ‐ JEF, JP, MS and GS 
J=JEF (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1651 0.0455 0.1173 0.1923* 0.3289*** 0.1479*** 0.1664* -0.0427 0.0863* 0.0916 0.2433*** 0.2149* 0.1381 
pessi -0.0394 -0.0668 -0.1252* -0.0645 -0.0976 -0.0583 -0.0619 -0.1095* -0.0841 -0.1068 -0.0553 -0.0663 -0.0858 
pessi*i 8.9302 14.9440*** 9.1240 3.1808 0.4472 1.1980 10.8883* 11.6370* 15.8926*** 3.5471 7.2349* 6.2260 9.7092 
J=JP (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.4869*** 0.4347*** 0.6515*** 0.0249 0.4089*** 0.1558 0.2140** 0.0366 0.5129*** 0.1312 0.3222*** 0.3841*** 0.3795*** 
pessi -0.0884* -0.1074** -0.1031** -0.1286** -0.1003* -0.1007 -0.1340*** -0.1518** -0.1532*** -0.2599*** -0.1050* -0.0870* -0.0770* 
pessi*i 9.0484 16.3055*** 8.5347* 14.7725*** 7.4075** 5.9684 15.3954** 9.3039* 16.5437*** 13.7864 5.2933 9.7224* 11.4510** 
J=MS (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.5333*** 0.4371*** 0.5471*** 0.1905*** 0.4793*** 0.3219*** 0.2893*** 0.0808 0.3828*** 0.0893 0.5212*** 0.6597*** 0.4996*** 
pessi -0.0385 -0.0790 -0.1169* -0.1612*** -0.0572 -0.0385 -0.0986* -0.2355*** -0.1534** -0.2464*** -0.0879** -0.0700* -0.0370 
pessi*i 14.0497** 19.4206*** 13.3926* 14.6807*** 12.5152*** 4.9937* 20.1805*** 13.4838 24.5583*** 21.4424* 9.7090** 5.0850 16.9070*** 
J=GS (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 1.5007*** 0.5826* 0.8658*** 0.6243*** 0.8058** 1.5322*** 1.1146*** 0.2740 0.8096 0.1072 1.0728*** 1.5405*** 1.1153*** 
pessi 0.0044 -0.1256 -0.1878 -0.2128 -0.0590 -0.1094 -0.2028 -0.3847* -0.2177 -0.3630** -0.1302 -0.1430 -0.1659 






J=RJF (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) (101) (102) (103) (104) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.3786*** 0.3020*** 0.3292*** 0.1779*** 0.3152*** 0.4429*** 0.1957*** 0.0755 0.2844*** 0.2224 0.3031*** 0.5168*** 0.5102*** 
pessi 0.0287 0.0020 -0.0220 -0.0438 0.0272 0.0237 -0.0237 -0.0536 -0.0083 -0.0697 0.0044 0.0197 -0.0214 
pessi*i 6.4815 11.6264*** 10.1209 5.9006** 7.7911*** -0.0557 0.8943 8.2837 11.0216** 4.2378 7.5636* -2.0329 1.8127 
J=SF (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) (111) (112) (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.2136* 0.0794 0.0231 -0.0277 0.1476* 0.1188*** 0.1018** 0.1474* 0.1273*** 0.1484 0.1399 0.2474** 0.0911 
pessi 0.0233 0.0418 0.0136 0.0182 0.0595 -0.0014 0.1068* 0.0415 0.0557 -0.0172 0.0001 0.0424 0.0043 
pessi*i 2.8137 4.9792 13.3315 10.7482*** 3.3492 3.5191 -2.1676 6.1289 9.6151* 6.0788 2.6570 -0.2083 10.2269 
J=WF (118) (119) (120) (121) (122) (123) (124) (125) (126) (127) (128) (129) (130) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.3071*** 0.3482*** 0.5109*** 0.0061 0.3953*** 0.2359*** 0.0444 0.0978* 0.0365 0.1841 0.1495** 0.1908** 0.1867** 
pessi 0.0165 0.0078 0.0526 0.0178 0.0203 0.0426 -0.0495 -0.0043 -0.0012 -0.0178 0.0124 0.0065 0.0063 
pessi*i 3.1277 2.9662* 0.5446 8.5767*** 0.7761 2.0214 3.9789 7.7450** 4.7635 1.2882 5.7975* 4.0691 6.4254 
J=BRK (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) (138) (139) (140) (141) (142) (143) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1106 0.0732 0.0383 -0.0030 0.0270 0.0277 0.0058 0.0710 0.0444 0.1868 0.0871 0.0491 0.0751 
pessi -0.0336 -0.0180 -0.0086 -0.0193 -0.0092 -0.0080 -0.0341 0.0054 -0.0129 -0.0279 -0.0021 -0.0137 -0.0020 





J=LEH (144) (145) (146) (147) (148) (149) (150) (151) (152) (153) (154) (155) (156) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK MLC BSC 
institution i 0.5500*** 0.3630*** 0.5977*** 0.2098*** 0.4458*** 0.6012*** 0.2898*** 0.4424*** 0.1834 0.4757*** 0.1394 0.6184*** 0.6378*** 
pessi -0.0372 -0.0624 -0.0262 -0.1022* -0.0235 0.0196 0.0027 -0.0973* -0.1553** -0.1004 -0.1559* 0.0039 0.0114 
pessi*i 10.9966 19.6516*** 10.2785 10.6209*** 10.5471*** 7.7803*** 4.2129* 13.1235** 8.4186 12.3588 15.3438 9.7732* 11.2040** 
J=MLC (157) (158) (159) (160) (161) (162) (163) (164) (165) (166) (167) (168) (169) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH BSC 
institution i 0.5784*** 0.3346*** 0.4567*** 0.0146 0.4653*** 0.5342*** 0.2271*** 0.3060*** 0.0569 0.4094*** 0.0045 0.4661*** 0.5477*** 
pessi -0.0220 -0.0615 -0.0163 -0.0677 -0.0179 0.0024 -0.0413 -0.0741 -0.1661*** -0.0894* -0.2007*** 0.0194 -0.0404 
pessi*i 6.0565 18.3854*** 13.1616*** 17.4062*** 8.0510*** 5.3257** 5.2947* 10.5807* 12.4956 14.0112*** 18.2187 7.8574* 10.6720** 
J=BSC (170) (171) (172) (173) (174) (175) (176) (177) (178) (179) (180) (181) (182) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC 
institution i 0.4662*** 0.2775*** 0.4891*** 0.0907** 0.3848*** 0.4913*** 0.2096*** 0.3805*** 0.0906 0.4081*** 0.1316 0.4899*** 0.5819*** 
pessi -0.0266 -0.0321 -0.0173 -0.0480 0.0074 0.0062 -0.0188 0.0037 -0.0808* -0.0074 -0.0773 -0.0067 0.0005 






J=JEF (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i -0.0627 -0.1875 -0.4687* -0.1717 0.0564 0.1867 -0.1325 -0.5783** -0.1050 -0.4395 0.1875 -0.1189 -0.1829 
vix -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002* 0.0001 -0.0001 
vix*i 0.0177 0.0200** 0.0324*** 0.0188* 0.0111 -0.0009 0.0183** 0.0322** 0.0151 0.0267* 0.0063 0.0184 0.0214 
J=JP (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.0184 -0.1772 0.5146*** -0.3693*** 0.0999 -0.0439 -0.0908 -0.2401 0.1895** -0.6859** 0.1541 0.2647 0.0818 
vix -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0009*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
vix*i 0.0250*** 0.0367*** 0.0093* 0.0307*** 0.0160*** 0.0119*** 0.0205*** 0.0178* 0.0213*** 0.0472*** 0.0110* 0.0099 0.0183* 
J=MS (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.2241 0.1173 0.1071 -0.1197 0.4145 0.3284*** -0.1393 -0.1196 -0.0670 -0.3238 0.3807* 0.2610* -0.0189 
vix -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
vix*i 0.0215*** 0.0237*** 0.0258*** 0.0188** 0.0105 0.0036 0.0317*** 0.0157 0.0363*** 0.0242 0.0110 0.0203*** 0.0326*** 
J=GS (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 1.3555** -0.2810 0.3253 0.6886* 1.0321*** 0.5698* 0.5143 0.0164 0.8079 -0.5969 1.1890*** 1.1064*** -0.0180 
vix -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0016*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0010*** 







J=RJF (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) (101) (102) (103) (104) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i -0.0006 -0.0475 -0.0235 -0.3064*** 0.0348 0.1439 0.0941 -0.4828*** 0.0329 -0.1420 0.3004* 0.2317 0.2225 
vix -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
vix*i 0.0212*** 0.0207*** 0.0204*** 0.0251*** 0.0157*** 0.0112* 0.0039 0.0311*** 0.0142** 0.0171 0.0046 0.0088 0.0125 
J=SF (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) (111) (112) (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.2624 0.1501 0.2206 0.0669 0.3061* 0.1062 0.1690 0.0232 0.2917*** 0.0205 0.3077 0.3441 0.2905 
vix 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0003** 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
vix*i 0.0001 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011 -0.0041 0.0035 -0.0044 0.0087 0.0004 0.0061 -0.0056 -0.0045 -0.0018 
J=WF (118) (119) (120) (121) (122) (123) (124) (125) (126) (127) (128) (129) (130) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1471 0.1556* 0.4230*** -0.1345 0.4188*** 0.0482 0.0285 -0.0164 -0.2912*** 0.2910 0.1277 0.1074 0.1340 
vix -0.0001* -0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0004*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0002** 
vix*i 0.0085** 0.0113*** 0.0038 0.0131*** -0.0008 0.0096** 0.0024 0.0102*** 0.0180*** -0.0051 0.0051* 0.0068* 0.0047 
J=BRK (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) (138) (139) (140) (141) (142) (143) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF LEH MLC BSC 
institution i -0.1734 -0.1562 -0.2374*** -0.1028 -0.3002*** -0.2454** -0.1958** -0.2946** -0.1422 -0.1371 -0.0441 -0.1420 -0.0436 
vix -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 






J=JEF (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i -0.1443 -0.3318* -0.4922** -0.2198 0.0576 0.1849 -0.1407 -0.5586** -0.1108 -0.3827 0.1872 -0.1053 -0.2454 
pessi -0.0613 -0.0786 -0.1057* -0.0500 -0.0653 -0.0201 -0.0564 -0.0698 -0.0977 -0.0475 -0.0156 -0.0713 -0.0791 
vix -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002* 0.0001 -0.0001 
pessi*i 6.9107 8.9154*** 3.3622 1.6655 -2.0956 1.1815 7.0066 7.6723 8.1625 1.5179 6.3353 3.3084 5.2856 
vix*i 0.0150 0.0198** 0.0292*** 0.0195** 0.0120 -0.0013 0.0159* 0.0267* 0.0123 0.0222 0.0023 0.0160 0.0208 
J=JP (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.0329 -0.2042* 0.4768*** -0.4194*** 0.0647 -0.0713 -0.0996 -0.2466* 0.2001 -0.7929** 0.0714 0.2049 0.0402 
pessi -0.0103 -0.0159 -0.0209 -0.0470 -0.0239 0.0290 -0.0602 -0.0461 -0.0389 -0.1013** -0.0051 0.0065 -0.0130 
vix -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0007*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0009*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0004***
pessi*i 2.1051 5.8561*** 8.0180* 8.2961*** 3.0432 4.3697 10.7343** 5.9103 9.2365* 8.9647 5.7935 9.4116* 5.5126 
vix*i 0.0231*** 0.0334*** 0.0054 0.0272*** 0.0158** 0.0102* 0.0152** 0.0155** 0.0144* 0.0418*** 0.0107 0.0063 0.0168 
J=MS (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1023 0.0088 0.0582 -0.2801 0.3417 0.3450*** -0.1789 -0.2248 -0.0535 -0.3094 0.2290 0.1775 -0.1194 
pessi 0.0222 0.0113 -0.0119 -0.0643 0.0057 -0.0083 -0.0409 -0.1010 -0.0521 -0.0444 -0.0154 -0.0271 0.0141 
vix -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
pessi*i 12.7913* 11.9073*** 13.7794* 11.8682*** 11.9712*** 4.7872* 13.3785* 7.1840 12.7849* 18.1151* 11.9564** 3.9621 11.5965** 
vix*i 0.0182** 0.0206*** 0.0192*** 0.0196*** 0.0055 -0.0009 0.0264*** 0.0173* 0.0246** 0.0130 0.0091* 0.0208*** 0.0289** 
J=GS (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 1.3871*** -0.3924 0.1097 0.6469* 1.0707*** 0.5646* 0.5231 -0.1074 0.7105 -0.3454 1.1797** 1.0423*** -0.0515 
pessi 0.1167 0.0500 0.0274 0.0933 0.1485 0.0096 -0.0288 -0.0226 0.0521 -0.0462 0.0685 0.0846 0.0213 
vix -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0016*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0010***
pessi*i 21.1651* 19.1183 30.8657* 11.2210 25.4354** -1.8571 0.6622 -6.4814 18.3137 28.8088 10.1007 8.0389 7.8647 





J=RJF (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) (101) (102) (103) (104) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS SF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i -0.0307 -0.0741 -0.1514 -0.2676** 0.0149 0.1799 0.0785 -0.5028** -0.0810 -0.1314 0.2389 0.2694 0.2245 
pessi 0.0801* 0.0531 0.0636 0.0566 0.0525 0.0636 0.0462 0.0352 0.0227 0.0118 0.0512 0.0377 0.0452 
vix -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0003***
pessi*i 2.4580 3.7162 10.4125* -2.6469 2.0859 0.1888 1.6587 2.5052 9.3672* 1.2628 7.8362*** -1.5454 -1.4120 
vix*i 0.0209*** 0.0174** 0.0188*** 0.0248*** 0.0151*** 0.0104* 0.0033 0.0301*** 0.0131 0.0154 0.0012 0.0098 0.0127 
J=SF (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) (111) (112) (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF WF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.2773 0.1269 0.1429 -0.0161 0.2789 0.1013 0.1800* -0.0642 0.2492* -0.1222 0.3256 0.3424 0.2403 
pessi 0.0162 0.0125 0.0067 0.0059 0.0284 -0.0151 0.0712 0.0258 0.0407 -0.0448 -0.0185 0.0047 -0.0018 
vix 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002** -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0000 
pessi*i 3.2604 1.1593 13.5602 10.2025*** 4.3009* 2.8164 -0.7196 5.1439 11.2800* 3.6943 5.1128 1.3459 9.3646 
vix*i -0.0041 0.0003 -0.0055 -0.0004 -0.0058 0.0014 -0.0039 0.0093 -0.0057 0.0093 -0.0096 -0.0056 -0.0063 
J=WF (118) (119) (120) (121) (122) (123) (124) (125) (126) (127) (128) (129) (130) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF BRK LEH MLC BSC 
institution i 0.1424 0.1670** 0.4301*** -0.1591* 0.4158*** 0.0081 0.0266 -0.0253 -0.2514* 0.2952 0.0933 0.0510 0.0800 
pessi 0.0374 0.0218 0.0570* 0.0384 0.0446 0.0767* 0.0432 0.0211 0.0072 -0.0027 0.0393 0.0514 0.0444 
vix -0.0001* -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0001** -0.0002** 
pessi*i 1.9631 -0.8562 2.8415 5.9844*** 0.0892 0.8331 3.0429* 5.5113* 2.0428 1.1376 4.8383* 2.5103 5.2224 
vix*i 0.0077** 0.0113*** 0.0015 0.0107*** -0.0005 0.0104* 0.0006 0.0072* 0.0153** -0.0061 0.0033 0.0077* 0.0044 
J=BRK (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) (138) (139) (140) (141) (142) (143) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF LEH MLC BSC 
institution i -0.1722 -0.1602 -0.2656*** -0.1568** -0.3260** -0.2382** -0.2027** -0.2885** -0.1556 -0.1282 -0.0403 -0.1458 -0.0952 
pessi 0.0084 0.0191 0.0144 0.0291 0.0192 0.0126 0.0250 0.0196 -0.0080 -0.0098 0.0230 0.0480 0.0322 
vix -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
pessi*i 2.8732 1.9422 4.8032 3.9043** 2.6444* 2.1780 2.0632 1.5838 0.5042 -8.3914 1.3839 1.2830 2.7180 






J=LEH (144) (145) (146) (147) (148) (149) (150) (151) (152) (153) (154) (155) (156) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK MLC BSC 
institution i -0.0789 -0.3487*** 0.0603 -0.3671*** 0.2644 0.0485 0.1642 -0.0652 -0.2048 0.0767 -0.2515 0.0159 0.0187 
pessi 0.0316 0.0219 -0.0033 -0.0218 0.0194 0.0162 0.0245 -0.0340 -0.0193 -0.0085 -0.0287 0.0483 0.0477 
vix -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
pessi*i 5.2664 15.1895*** 6.9341 7.4937*** 5.1142*** 5.0181* 4.5408* 5.5401 2.4175 13.0560* 11.2340 4.5802 6.8583 
vix*i 0.0288*** 0.0292*** 0.0225*** 0.0268*** 0.0109 0.0235*** 0.0047 0.0270*** 0.0201** 0.0135 0.0193 0.0276*** 0.0294*** 
J=MLC (157) (158) (159) (160) (161) (162) (163) (164) (165) (166) (167) (168) (169) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH BSC 
institution i 0.2984* 0.1142 0.4080*** -0.2026* 0.4244* 0.2511* 0.2015* -0.0653 -0.0884 -0.0054 -0.2681 0.3649** 0.1610 
pessi 0.0076 0.0159 0.0434 -0.0293 0.0307 -0.0024 0.0155 -0.0359 -0.0410 -0.0580 -0.0759 0.0440 0.0081 
vix -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
pessi*i 3.6870 9.4357*** 14.6739** 14.3019*** 8.8251*** 2.1939 6.0775** 9.7351* 6.9303 13.5781** 16.6466* 7.5131* 7.1526* 
vix*i 0.0132* 0.0156*** 0.0016 0.0126*** 0.0005 0.0146*** 0.0003 0.0177*** 0.0084 0.0203* 0.0120 0.0031 0.0182*** 
J=BSC (170) (171) (172) (173) (174) (175) (176) (177) (178) (179) (180) (181) (182) 
I= CITI AIG BOA JEF JP MS GS RJF SF WF BRK LEH MLC 
institution i 0.0831 -0.1761* 0.1722 -0.2251* 0.2856* 0.2990** 0.3784*** -0.0395 -0.2073 -0.0362 -0.0257 0.3503** 0.3988** 
pessi 0.0015 0.0062 0.0092 -0.0193 0.0129 0.0105 -0.0007 0.0112 -0.0512 -0.0222 -0.0216 0.0043 0.0016 
vix -0.0001** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0001 -0.0000 
pessi*i 5.1558 11.9321*** 6.9985 7.5622*** 4.7456** 0.4904 5.1055 5.6258 0.4986 10.6795** 11.0586 2.7711 2.0959 
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Table A6: VIX Versus Consumer pessimism – In-Sample Forecasts Performance Squared difference between the mean of CoVaR estimate and the 










(x 10^-3) (x 10^-3) 
JEF SF 0.001348 0.006212 -78.3% 
BRK SF 0.001092 0.002792 -60.9% 
JEF BRK 0.002446 0.004986 -50.9% 
SF JEF 0.028855 0.037693 -23.4% 
JEF JP 0.091049 0.112974 -19.4% 
WF SF 0.005178 0.005947 -12.9% 
WF BRK 0.021346 0.02395 -10.9% 
JEF AIG 0.062645 0.069599 -10.0% 
JEF CITI 0.134832 0.147807 -8.8% 
BSC WF 0.23568 0.254603 -7.4% 
MS GS 0.863722 0.904554 -4.5% 
JEF WF 0.070912 0.071618 -1.0% 
GS BRK 0.68519 0.678891 0.9% 
BSC JP 0.268478 0.265415 1.2% 
GS BOA 1.698297 1.667934 1.8% 
CITI WF 0.267751 0.262877 1.9% 
WF AIG 0.119578 0.116445 2.7% 
SF WF 0.162571 0.157727 3.1% 
BOA GS 0.107626 0.103047 4.4% 
JEF GS 0.060993 0.057879 5.4% 
BOA JP 0.174775 0.165523 5.6% 
JEF MLC 0.182499 0.172832 5.6% 
SF RJF 0.167125 0.158001 5.8% 
SF CITI 0.182616 0.172409 5.9% 
BSC SF 0.053479 0.05025 6.4% 
SF MLC 0.157075 0.146518 7.2% 
SF AIG 0.066673 0.062071 7.4% 
BSC BRK 0.127392 0.118546 7.5% 
JEF RJF 0.18355 0.16997 8.0% 
SF LEH 0.117141 0.107688 8.8% 
BSC CITI 0.265247 0.24091 10.1% 
BOA BSC 0.126395 0.112381 12.5% 
BSC GS 0.268532 0.238456 12.6% 
BSC RJF 0.33022 0.291642 13.2% 
BSC BOA 0.348339 0.307598 13.2% 
BSC MLC 0.388206 0.340876 13.9% 
WF JP 0.162207 0.141859 14.3% 
SF JP 0.118099 0.101082 16.8% 
BSC LEH 0.359281 0.305747 17.5% 
JEF BSC 0.111397 0.094303 18.1% 
JEF BOA 0.08935 0.075283 18.7% 
WF BOA 0.15351 0.129307 18.7% 
45 
 
BSC JEF 0.087775 0.07388 18.8% 
MLC WF 0.266664 0.224096 19.0% 
WF LEH 0.103668 0.087002 19.2% 
MS JP 0.464364 0.389533 19.2% 
MS CITI 0.436805 0.362972 20.3% 
WF RJF 0.058369 0.048426 20.5% 
WF CITI 0.101197 0.083329 21.4% 
BSC AIG 0.243456 0.198192 22.8% 
GS CITI 2.251574 1.816101 24.0% 
JEF MS 0.203619 0.162421 25.4% 
RJF LEH 0.264967 0.208018 27.4% 
GS JP 1.408588 1.094015 28.8% 
SF BOA 0.142208 0.1091 30.3% 
WF MLC 0.077473 0.059415 30.4% 
RJF BOA 0.148713 0.113748 30.7% 
MLC BOA 0.349194 0.263843 32.3% 
CITI JP 0.333534 0.251217 32.8% 
AIG WF 0.170349 0.128261 32.8% 
MLC JP 0.286852 0.21592 32.9% 
MLC CITI 0.391139 0.293382 33.3% 
CITI MLC 0.254317 0.189533 34.2% 
WF MS 0.111901 0.082511 35.6% 
RJF JP 0.14382 0.104889 37.1% 
CITI BOA 0.35542 0.25916 37.1% 
RJF BSC 0.281552 0.204206 37.9% 
MLC MS 0.391043 0.28355 37.9% 
SF MS 0.109636 0.079361 38.1% 
WF BSC 0.068159 0.049255 38.4% 
CITI AIG 0.356751 0.2563 39.2% 
BSC MS 0.329964 0.236579 39.5% 
MS BOA 0.476719 0.341785 39.5% 
MLC BSC 0.423276 0.303287 39.6% 
BOA WF 0.236673 0.169034 40.0% 
BOA CITI 0.14801 0.105643 40.1% 
LEH BRK 0.169178 0.120344 40.6% 
LEH MLC 0.529538 0.37617 40.8% 
MS MLC 0.500943 0.35345 41.7% 
SF BSC 0.223127 0.156753 42.3% 
JP WF 0.310759 0.217563 42.8% 
AIG BSC 0.11791 0.08253 42.9% 
SF BRK 0.052371 0.036378 44.0% 
MLC AIG 0.330738 0.229191 44.3% 
AIG BRK 0.201168 0.137827 46.0% 
MLC LEH 0.380993 0.259091 47.0% 
AIG GS 0.239133 0.160657 48.8% 
BOA AIG 0.202346 0.13547 49.4% 
AIG MS 0.149524 0.099577 50.2% 
MS LEH 0.577682 0.383825 50.5% 
CITI LEH 0.236735 0.156796 51.0% 
LEH BSC 0.501678 0.324237 54.7% 
MS BSC 0.539633 0.34499 56.4% 
46 
 
JP JEF 0.067043 0.042832 56.5% 
CITI BSC 0.282512 0.180468 56.5% 
AIG JP 0.156646 0.099946 56.7% 
RJF CITI 0.218286 0.138976 57.1% 
BOA MS 0.126978 0.080536 57.7% 
JEF LEH 0.202382 0.127506 58.7% 
CITI MS 0.302157 0.190302 58.8% 
JP CITI 0.355735 0.223006 59.5% 
JP BOA 0.378491 0.23673 59.9% 
RJF GS 0.179721 0.110255 63.0% 
JP MLC 0.296283 0.178151 66.3% 
MLC GS 0.433302 0.259907 66.7% 
LEH BOA 0.413269 0.247399 67.0% 
JP AIG 0.315109 0.188461 67.2% 
JP BSC 0.343118 0.204938 67.4% 
CITI RJF 0.185184 0.110154 68.1% 
BOA LEH 0.168994 0.099637 69.6% 
MLC RJF 0.212559 0.124411 70.9% 
AIG RJF 0.093703 0.054727 71.2% 
BOA MLC 0.15812 0.092123 71.6% 
LEH GS 0.478279 0.277932 72.1% 
GS RJF 2.550447 1.472852 73.2% 
MS BRK 0.264367 0.151767 74.2% 
AIG LEH 0.16861 0.0964 74.9% 
LEH CITI 0.363672 0.206981 75.7% 
RJF MS 0.200932 0.114333 75.7% 
MS AIG 0.459558 0.259745 76.9% 
MS WF 0.499094 0.281082 77.6% 
RJF MLC 0.286472 0.160654 78.3% 
AIG BOA 0.174625 0.097744 78.7% 
AIG CITI 0.154943 0.085242 81.8% 
GS MLC 2.658803 1.455671 82.7% 
JP GS 0.646734 0.353902 82.7% 
LEH MS 0.577596 0.314995 83.4% 
JP BRK 0.220221 0.114724 92.0% 
BOA BRK 0.102546 0.053257 92.6% 
GS MS 1.99941 1.022503 95.5% 
AIG MLC 0.167654 0.085377 96.4% 
LEH JP 0.469054 0.238267 96.9% 
LEH RJF 0.398677 0.197823 101.5% 
GS WF 1.075598 0.532953 101.8% 
GS LEH 2.81106 1.386438 102.8% 
BOA RJF 0.076691 0.037485 104.6% 
CITI GS 0.216809 0.104545 107.4% 
JP RJF 0.181793 0.08624 110.8% 
BOA JEF 0.071241 0.033762 111.0% 
CITI JEF 0.111532 0.052152 113.9% 
GS BSC 2.244267 1.035857 116.7% 
JP LEH 0.387601 0.178715 116.9% 
MS RJF 0.47089 0.210418 123.8% 
RJF WF 0.140901 0.062355 126.0% 
47 
 
MS SF 0.101603 0.044303 129.3% 
BRK LEH 0.030063 0.013024 130.8% 
AIG JEF 0.064461 0.027912 130.9% 
JP MS 0.377644 0.163366 131.2% 
MLC JEF 0.109566 0.047214 132.1% 
GS AIG 1.032199 0.439094 135.1% 
MLC BRK 0.098885 0.039477 150.5% 
WF JEF 0.022556 0.008955 151.9% 
RJF AIG 0.190069 0.073804 157.5% 
BRK CITI 0.030741 0.011867 159.1% 
RJF BRK 0.10615 0.038141 178.3% 
CITI SF 0.026407 0.00923 186.1% 
JP SF 0.012447 0.004314 188.6% 
GS JEF 1.500112 0.503509 197.9% 
MS JEF 0.265374 0.08788 202.0% 
CITI BRK 0.236172 0.075339 213.5% 
LEH WF 0.385154 0.122637 214.1% 
BRK MLC 0.012359 0.003935 214.1% 
RJF JEF 0.103375 0.031313 230.1% 
BOA SF 0.017565 0.004996 251.6% 
BRK RJF 0.014456 0.00388 272.6% 
LEH JEF 0.22054 0.054045 308.1% 
LEH AIG 0.328151 0.077585 323.0% 
WF GS 0.062842 0.014317 338.9% 
MLC SF 0.03069 0.005489 459.1% 
SF GS 0.05225 0.00853 512.6% 
GS SF 0.377937 0.057001 563.0% 
BRK GS 0.008146 0.001191 584.3% 
BRK BSC 0.016206 0.00226 617.0% 
AIG SF 0.032092 0.004021 698.1% 
BRK AIG 0.007167 0.000474 1411.7% 
RJF SF 0.05919 0.003486 1597.9% 
LEH SF 0.161751 0.00943 1615.2% 
BRK BOA 0.009276 0.000331 2704.9% 
BRK MS 0.013134 0.000426 2985.3% 
BRK WF 0.009633 0.000207 4553.7% 
BRK JP 0.005766 5.98E-07 964180.9% 
BRK JEF 0.012444 4.43E-07 2808816.5% 
Positives 170 
Negatives 12 
      Total 182 





Table A7: VIX Versus Consumer pessimism – Out-of-Sample 2-Day Forecasts Performance Squared difference between the predicted mean of 
CoVaR estimate and the actual 2-Day 5% quantile return – Estimation up to November 16, 2005; forecast for November 17 and 18, 2005 
Ranked by % deviation between consumer pessimism and VIX discrepancy, column 3 
   
















SF JEF 1.942171 2.437922 -20.33% 
SF WF 2.352344 2.739969 -14.15% 
SF AIG 2.159423 2.405204 -10.22% 
SF JP 2.475478 2.491328 -0.64% 
SF BRK 2.261274 2.245394 0.71% 
SF GS 2.29275 2.264019 1.27% 
SF BSC 2.752075 2.702424 1.84% 
SF MLC 2.535226 2.484764 2.03% 
SF RJF 2.761573 2.630625 4.98% 
SF LEH 2.359133 2.246216 5.03% 
SF BOA 2.440557 2.307223 5.78% 
SF CITI 2.72266 2.542945 7.07% 
SF MS 2.464602 2.206785 11.68% 
WF SF 1.209807 1.044809 15.79% 
JEF AIG 3.338412 2.868381 16.39% 
JEF CITI 3.682307 3.129714 17.66% 
JEF JP 3.429453 2.914651 17.66% 
JEF BSC 3.449061 2.764018 24.78% 
JEF MLC 3.917805 3.115407 25.76% 
JEF RJF 4.118752 3.26246 26.25% 
JEF SF 2.743714 2.17014 26.43% 
JEF WF 3.223473 2.549242 26.45% 
WF JEF 1.326308 1.019821 30.05% 
JEF BOA 3.479617 2.664378 30.60% 
WF BSC 1.769753 1.349094 31.18% 
WF CITI 1.886441 1.40757 34.02% 
WF AIG 2.146627 1.593275 34.73% 
WF RJF 1.624222 1.202967 35.02% 
CITI BSC 3.601528 2.635827 36.64% 
CITI WF 3.550954 2.561837 38.61% 
BSC WF 1.719433 1.223378 40.55% 
RJF BSC 5.369456 3.79219 41.59% 
BSC RJF 2.029397 1.425937 42.32% 
WF JP 2.417924 1.672796 44.54% 
WF MLC 1.866618 1.290811 44.61% 
WF MS 1.914226 1.28611 48.84% 
RJF CITI 5.008324 3.347965 49.59% 
WF BOA 2.134768 1.420231 50.31% 
LEH BSC 6.28787 4.154412 51.35% 
MLC BSC 5.35346 3.511132 52.47% 
RJF MLC 5.341581 3.489589 53.07% 
CITI MLC 3.998764 2.611924 53.10% 
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MS BSC 6.96885 4.516205 54.31% 
BOA WF 3.140622 2.033107 54.47% 
MLC WF 4.932084 3.161284 56.02% 
RJF JP 5.127772 3.283734 56.16% 
BSC JEF 1.412601 0.900307 56.90% 
MLC JP 5.526424 3.502794 57.77% 
BSC MLC 2.187609 1.382984 58.18% 
RJF WF 4.903589 3.096208 58.37% 
RJF JEF 4.744335 2.987588 58.80% 
JEF MS 3.939287 2.478377 58.95% 
MS CITI 6.560898 4.088221 60.48% 
BOA BSC 3.041599 1.895133 60.50% 
CITI RJF 3.528651 2.180423 61.83% 
CITI JP 4.323224 2.653184 62.94% 
AIG WF 2.255066 1.38219 63.15% 
MLC CITI 5.372175 3.252335 65.18% 
BSC SF 1.263006 0.764228 65.27% 
BSC CITI 1.951362 1.178994 65.51% 
CITI JEF 3.204092 1.933635 65.70% 
MLC RJF 4.669344 2.817482 65.73% 
LEH MLC 6.608833 3.96781 66.56% 
CITI AIG 4.325739 2.580052 67.66% 
RJF MS 5.00636 2.985415 67.69% 
RJF SF 4.492619 2.677917 67.77% 
MS MLC 6.88662 4.071109 69.16% 
MLC JEF 4.261969 2.518174 69.25% 
BOA CITI 3.052892 1.790913 70.47% 
CITI BOA 4.236309 2.475193 71.15% 
MLC MS 5.581189 3.259196 71.24% 
RJF BOA 5.305974 3.088313 71.81% 
BSC JP 2.144636 1.239833 72.98% 
CITI SF 2.491138 1.42718 74.55% 
BSC BOA 2.07402 1.181718 75.51% 
MLC BOA 5.287671 3.011216 75.60% 
MLC AIG 5.226555 2.971304 75.90% 
RJF AIG 5.238264 2.967131 76.54% 
MS JP 6.946926 3.918919 77.27% 
BOA MS 2.857921 1.606003 77.95% 
BOA JP 3.209478 1.798234 78.48% 
BOA JEF 2.638358 1.449512 82.02% 
CITI LEH 3.452426 1.855065 86.11% 
CITI MS 4.116371 2.211076 86.17% 
MLC LEH 5.197607 2.78556 86.59% 
JP BSC 4.255633 2.279116 86.72% 
MLC SF 3.784847 2.022245 87.16% 
BOA RJF 2.672751 1.422405 87.90% 
BSC AIG 1.874667 0.994305 88.54% 
AIG BSC 2.374555 1.258444 88.69% 
BOA MLC 3.143259 1.659789 89.38% 
RJF LEH 5.403325 2.852984 89.39% 
AIG JEF 1.907632 1.007076 89.42% 
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BOA AIG 3.341969 1.760011 89.88% 
MS RJF 6.823609 3.577242 90.75% 
JEF LEH 3.545684 1.850303 91.63% 
JP JEF 3.145373 1.634583 92.43% 
AIG RJF 2.114039 1.09471 93.11% 
GS CITI 28.15998 14.5007 94.20% 
BSC LEH 1.772998 0.908252 95.21% 
MS WF 6.862239 3.501405 95.99% 
MS LEH 6.685837 3.401514 96.55% 
GS RJF 31.72663 16.08741 97.21% 
BOA SF 2.298774 1.158791 98.38% 
LEH CITI 5.809449 2.906126 99.90% 
MS SF 5.407621 2.693029 100.80% 
GS WF 25.59517 12.74187 100.87% 
JP CITI 4.297112 2.125471 102.17% 
LEH RJF 6.225182 3.071242 102.69% 
GS BSC 30.89066 15.13654 104.08% 
GS JP 28.37911 13.8869 104.36% 
LEH MS 6.77536 3.294801 105.64% 
MS AIG 6.924701 3.359109 106.15% 
MS JEF 6.373816 3.061018 108.23% 
JP RJF 3.734957 1.79169 108.46% 
AIG MLC 2.468744 1.181758 108.90% 
JP WF 3.957147 1.89385 108.95% 
JP AIG 4.425122 2.11459 109.27% 
RJF GS 5.722419 2.731988 109.46% 
JP MLC 4.074294 1.940848 109.92% 
MS BOA 7.594952 3.604424 110.71% 
AIG SF 1.657549 0.785626 110.98% 
WF LEH 1.804632 0.850286 112.24% 
GS AIG 26.64104 12.49895 113.15% 
AIG CITI 2.460526 1.151872 113.61% 
BSC MS 2.018141 0.943933 113.80% 
MS GS 8.163847 3.809699 114.29% 
GS SF 22.7627 10.55 115.76% 
AIG MS 2.332002 1.078957 116.13% 
LEH JEF 5.254715 2.425364 116.66% 
BRK MLC 0.739624 0.339753 117.69% 
GS MLC 33.66457 15.42563 118.24% 
LEH BOA 6.454493 2.944171 119.23% 
JP SF 2.938582 1.335202 120.09% 
BRK RJF 0.750436 0.340962 120.09% 
GS MS 31.46671 14.27371 120.45% 
GS BOA 31.18878 14.10693 121.09% 
GS JEF 28.0317 12.61509 122.21% 
JEF BRK 2.397102 1.076112 122.76% 
RJF BRK 4.710132 2.097832 124.52% 
AIG JP 2.523475 1.12176 124.96% 
BRK JP 0.636003 0.282649 125.02% 
LEH JP 6.439223 2.840384 126.70% 
GS BRK 23.10686 10.17514 127.09% 
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BRK SF 0.581099 0.254116 128.67% 
AIG BOA 2.688913 1.174215 129.00% 
AIG LEH 2.476247 1.075899 130.16% 
BRK BOA 0.698814 0.301198 132.01% 
BRK WF 0.677333 0.291402 132.44% 
JEF GS 3.510898 1.504399 133.38% 
BRK JEF 0.728465 0.311729 133.69% 
LEH WF 5.464827 2.326141 134.93% 
LEH SF 5.086164 2.163997 135.04% 
BRK LEH 0.773021 0.328154 135.57% 
JP BOA 4.32927 1.827341 136.92% 
LEH GS 6.886521 2.896788 137.73% 
BRK BSC 0.776659 0.324579 139.28% 
WF BRK 1.272625 0.530105 140.07% 
BRK AIG 0.722566 0.298538 142.03% 
BOA LEH 2.860044 1.180462 142.28% 
BRK CITI 0.874161 0.350966 149.07% 
BOA GS 3.197381 1.270108 151.74% 
AIG GS 2.959318 1.159527 155.22% 
LEH BRK 4.611801 1.784134 158.49% 
BRK MS 0.705696 0.271661 159.77% 
MLC GS 6.351687 2.44041 160.27% 
GS LEH 30.69075 11.70576 162.19% 
AIG BRK 2.488509 0.92648 168.60% 
LEH AIG 6.105378 2.249433 171.42% 
JP MS 4.841676 1.782174 171.67% 
BSC GS 2.123255 0.735282 188.77% 
WF GS 1.964035 0.648868 202.69% 
BRK GS 0.775596 0.253102 206.44% 
CITI GS 3.775725 1.135736 232.45% 
MLC BRK 4.338983 1.298038 234.27% 
JP LEH 4.10638 1.218104 237.11% 
MS BRK 6.103475 1.80824 237.54% 
BOA BRK 2.674179 0.789614 238.67% 
BSC BRK 1.457221 0.331498 339.59% 
JP BRK 3.989927 0.855356 366.46% 
CITI BRK 3.455858 0.724744 376.84% 
JP GS 5.397227 1.077779 400.77% 
   Positives 178 
   Negatives 4 
   Total 182 
 
 
 
